On involuntary unemployment: notes on efficiency-wage competition by Guerrazzi, Marco
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
On involuntary unemployment: notes on
efficiency-wage competition
Marco Guerrazzi
Department of Economics and Management, University of Pisa
2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38140/
MPRA Paper No. 38140, posted 16. April 2012 15:32 UTC
 
 
ON INVOLUNTARY UNEMPLOYMENT: 
NOTES ON EFFICIENCY-WAGE COMPETITION* 
 
 
MARCO GUERRAZZI‡ 
 
Department of Economics and Management 
University of Pisa 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper introduces a model of efficiency-wage competition along the lines put forward by 
Hahn (1987). Specifically, I analyse a two-firm economy in which employers screen their 
workforce by means of increasing wage offers competing one another for high-quality 
employees. The main results are the following. First, using a specification of effort such that 
the problem of firms is concave, optimal wage offers are strategic complements. Second, a 
symmetric Nash equilibrium can be locally stable under the assumption that firms adjust their 
wage offers in the direction of increasing profits by conjecturing that any wage offer above 
(below) equilibrium will lead competitors to underbid (overbid) such an offer. Finally, the 
exploration of possible labour market equilibria reveals that effort is counter-cyclical. 
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1. Introduction 
Discussing the actual possibility of involuntary unemployment equilibria, Hahn (1987) 
sketches a model economy in which a finite set of firms is engaged in a wage competition 
process within an efficiency-wage setting. In that paper, resuming some arguments of 
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Cournot’s (1838) game, Hahn (1987) describes a situation in which under a persistent excess 
of labour supply, firms do not cut wages not only because this would lower their profitability, 
but also because wage cuts would enhance the productivity of their competitors. Building on 
this strategic framework, Hahn (1987) argues that involuntary unemployment is well defined, 
compatible with rationality and not inconsistent with an equilibrium of the model economy. 
The main goal of Hahn’s (1987) model is to show that firms might find unprofitable to 
voluntary agree on a generalized wage reduction in order to reduce equilibrium 
unemployment.1 However, important aspects of the efficiency-wage competition process in 
which firms are assumed to be engaged are left unexplored. For instance, although reaction 
functions are explicitly derived, nothing is said about the strategic relation among the optimal 
wage offers put forward by competing firms. Moreover, the achievement of a Nash 
equilibrium in the efficiency-wage competition process is taken for granted without 
specifying which kind of out-of-equilibrium adjustment might lead to the mutual consistency 
among firms’ wage offers. Finally, on a genuine macroeconomic perspective, there is no 
discussion about the cyclical behaviour of effort. 
This paper aims at filling the gaps mentioned above.2 Specifically, I build a two-firm 
efficiency-wage model in which each competitor tries to overbid the wage offer of the other 
employer aiming at maximizing its profits. Consistently with Akerlof (1984) and Hahn 
(1987), I assume that for each firm the efficiency of the employed labour force is positively 
correlated to its own wage offer but negatively correlated to the offer put forward by the other 
firm. Within this framework, I discuss the shape of the strategic relation among optimal wage 
offers and their link with the corresponding iso-profit curves. Thereafter, considering the most 
recurrent adjustment mechanisms exploited in similar game-theoretic contexts (e.g. Kopel 
1996 and Varian 1992), I consider the way in which the wage distribution prevailing in a 
symmetric Nash equilibrium can actually be achieved. Furthermore, taking into account 
possible labour market equilibria, I discuss effort cyclicality. 
                                                 
1 By contrast, macroeconomic interventions such as expansionary monetary policies could be more effective in 
this direction. 
2 In the context of segmented markets, Hahn’s (1987) model has been revisited inter-alia by van de Klundert 
(1988) and, more recently, by Jellal and Wolff (2002). Both contributions derive a Stackelberg version of Hahn’s 
(1987) model by assuming that the primary sector acts as a leader by setting efficiency-wages while the 
secondary sector acts as a follower by paying competitive wages. A more general Stackelberg version of the 
model is derived in Appendix. 
 
MARCO GUERRAZZI 
 3
The main results of this theoretical exploration are the following. First, using a 
specification of effort such that the problem of the representative firm is concave, optimal 
wage offers are strategic complements, i.e., whenever the competitor increases (decreases) its 
wage offer, the optimal response for each firm is to rise (decrease) its wage offer as well. 
Second, a symmetric Nash equilibrium exists but is unstable under the traditional cobweb 
adjustment. In other words, when the game is played by means of alternate wage offers there 
is no way to achieve the Nash equilibrium. Instead, such an allocation can be locally stable 
under the assumption that each firm continuously adjusts its optimal wage offer in the 
direction of increasing profits by conjecturing that any wage offer above (below) equilibrium 
will lead the competitor to underbid (overbid) such an offer. Moreover, the exploration of 
possible labour market equilibria reveals that effort is counter-cyclical, i.e., consistently with 
efficiency-wage models in which unemployment acts as a worker discipline device (e.g. Uhlig 
and Xu 1996 and Guerrazzi 2008), equilibria with higher (lower) unemployment are 
characterized by higher (lower) effort levels. 
The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 derives the 
symmetric Nash equilibrium. Section 4 investigates its local dynamics. Section 5 discusses 
possible labour market outcomes and the cyclicality of effort. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
The model economy is populated by two identical firms indexed by 2,1=i  and a mass SL  of 
identical workers that inelastically supply their labour services. As in Solow (1979), each firm 
seeks to maximize its profit ( iπ ) by taking into account that it can simultaneously set 
employment ( iL ) and the real wage ( iw ). Furthermore, as in Akerlof (1984) and Hahn (1987), 
the efficiency of the employed labour force ( ie ) is assumed to positively depends on the wage 
offer carried out by the firm that actually provides the job but negatively correlated to the 
wage offer put forward by the other firm. Therefore, the problem of each firm is given by 
                                ( )( ) iiijiiiiwL LwLwweFii −= , max, π       2,1, =ji                                              (1) 
where ( )⋅iF   is the production function of firm i  while ( ) 0>∂⋅∂ ii we  and ( ) 0<∂⋅∂ ji we . 
The first-order conditions (FOCs) for the problem in (1) are the following: 
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Exploiting the FOCs in (2), the Solow (1979) condition can be conveyed as 
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The expression in (3) suggests that in order to maximize profits, each firm has to set a 
real wage such that the effort-wage elasticity is equal to one no matter the shape of the 
production function.3 However, the intriguing feature of this framework is that the fulfilment 
of (3) does not only depend on the wage offer of the individual firm but also on the wage 
offer put forward by its competitor. As a consequence, similarly to the situation described by 
Cournot’s (1838) game in the context of output-quantity competition, the two firms are in a 
situation of strategic interaction. Specifically, the optimal wage offer of firm 1 depends on the 
offer put forward by firm 2 and vice-versa. 
In order to derive explicit results, it is necessary to define production and effort 
functions. First, for each firm, the production function is assumed to be the following: 
                                 ( )( ) ( )( )αijiiijiii LwweLwweF ,, =        10 <<α    2,1, =ji                          (4) 
where α  measures the curvature of the production possibilities.4 
Furthermore, for each firm, the effort function is assumed to be given by 
                                ( ) ( )βκ jijii wwwwe −+=,     0>κ , 10 << β  , 2,1, =ji                          (5) 
where κ  conveys productivity shocks while β  is the curvature of the effort function.5 
The expression in (5) suggests that the efficiency of the employed labour force is an 
exponential concave function that encloses an erratic positive term.6 Moreover, such a 
function increases (decreases) as the wage differential between the two firms becomes wider 
                                                 
3 An equivalent reading of the Solow (1979) condition provides that firms set the wage-employment pair in order 
to minimize the u-shaped cost of labour in terms of efficiency, i.e., in order to minimize the wage-effort ratio 
(e.g. Lindbeck and Snower 1987). 
4 Equivalent specifications are used by Akerlof (1982) and, more recently, by Alexopoulos (2004). 
5 Akerlof (1984) and Hahn (1987) consider a similar effort function that also positively depends on 
unemployment. In a subsequent part of the paper, I will show that this disciplining effect of unemployment 
endogenously emerges from the simplest formulation in (5). 
6 A concave effort function is a sufficient requirement for the concavity of the problem solved by each firm. 
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(tighter). Anecdotal evidence and empirical tests of efficiency-wage theories are consistent 
with this formulation (e.g. Raff and Summers 1987, Krueger and Summers 1988 and Huang 
et al. 1998). An illustration is given in figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Effort function. 
 
It is worth noting that in order to have a solution that fulfils the Solow (1979) 
condition the vertical intercept of the effort function has to be negative. As a consequence, for 
each firm, the wage offer of its competitor cannot be lower than κ . 
 
2. Nash equilibrium 
Combining (3) and (5) it becomes possible to derive the reaction functions ( if ) of the two 
firms. Straightforward calculations suggest that those functions are of the form 
                                           ji ww ββ
κ
−+−−= 1
1
1
     2,1, =ji                                                (6) 
The positive slope of the linear expression in (6) suggests that the optimal wage offers 
of the two firms are strategic complements, i.e., whenever the competitor increases 
(decreases) its wage offer, the optimal response for each firm is to rise (decrease) its wage 
offer as well. The rationale for such behaviour is straightforward. An increase (decrease) of 
the wage offer carried out by the competitor leads the u-shaped wage-effort ratio to shift right 
(left). As a consequence, in order to restore efficiency, each firm has to increase (decrease) its 
offer as well. 
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The Nash equilibrium is found where the two reaction functions intersect each other. 
Therefore, the symmetric optimal wage offer put forward is such a situation is given by 
                                                          β
κ=*iw        2,1, =ji                                                       (7) 
Plugging the result in (7) into (5) suggests that in equilibrium workers are paid more 
than their individual efficiency.7 An illustration is given in figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Nash equilibrium. 
 
The diagram in figure 2 shows the reaction functions of the two firms together with 
equilibrium iso-profit curves, i.e., the iso-profit curves associated to the wage distribution in 
(7). In general, for each firm, those curves are non-linear functions of the form 
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where ( ) αααα −−≡Φ 11  while iπ  is a constant level of profit. 
The set of non-linear functions conveyed by (8) is represented by reverse-u-shaped 
curves with a vertical intercept equal to κ  which reach their maximum in the point when they 
intersect the relevant reaction function. Moreover, for each firm, higher (lower) iso-profit 
curves, are associated with lower (higher) levels of profit. Furthermore, it is worth noting that 
                                                 
7 Indeed, βκκ β /< . 
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in figure 2 the equilibrium iso-profit curves of the two firms intersect each other. Obviously, 
this conveys the non-cooperative feature of the Nash equilibrium derived in this strategic 
context. 
 
3. Local dynamics 
Before discussing possible labour market outcomes, it is necessary to say something about the 
way in which the wage distribution in (7) can actually be reached; indeed, if starting from a 
different allocation there would be no way to achieved it, then such a wage distribution, 
together with its labour market implications, would loss a great deal of its practical 
significance. 
Assuming adjustments to lagged quantity signals, i.e., adjustments grounded on 
alternate wage offers, the Nash equilibrium is stable if and only if firm 1’s reaction function is 
steeper than firm 2’s reaction function (e.g. Kopel 1996). Taking the result in (6) into account, 
this happens whenever 
                                                    ( ) 11
1
2 <− β                                                                   (9) 
Considering the concavity of the effort function, (9) suggests that under the traditional 
cobweb adjustment the symmetric Nash equilibrium cannot be stable.8 Specifically, unless the 
starting wage distribution coincides with the one in (7), optimal wage offers explode or 
implode depending on whether their initial values are above or below βκ / . Obviously, such 
a badly-behaved pattern raises the issue of finding another possible mechanism able to 
describe how the Nash equilibrium might be actually reached. 
In this regard, a different type of micro-founded (or behavioural) adjustment can be 
derived by assuming that each firm adjusts its wage offer in the direction of increasing profits 
(e.g. Varian 1992). In this case, adjustments are simultaneous and the out-of-equilibrium 
dynamics of real wages is described by 
                                
( )( )
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
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i
ijii
i w
www
w
,πγ&     0>γ ,  2,1, =ji                                 (10) 
                                                 
8 Indeed, stability of the cobweb adjustment would imply a convex effort function, i.e., the strategic 
substitutability between optimal wage offers. However, as stated above, this requirement is inconsistent with the 
concavity of firms’ maximum-profit problem. 
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where ( )ij ww  is the conjecture of firm i  about the wage behaviour of firm j  while γ  is a 
constant that conveys the speed of adjustment.9 
Considering the properties of mutual consistency of a Nash equilibrium, I assume that 
each firm conjectures the wage behaviour of its competitor by means of the following 
conjectural or ‘learning’ rule: 
                               ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+= β
κλβ
κ
iiij www        2,1, =ji                                          (11) 
where iλ  is a constant that conveys the so-called conjectural variation, i.e., the ‘expected’ 
variation of the wage offer put forward by firm j  when firm i  marginally changes its own 
proposal. 
For each firm, (11) can be interpreted as an approximation of its competitor’s reaction 
function. Its main implications can be summarized as follows. First, when firm i  decides to 
offer the wage prevailing in the Nash equilibrium it conjectures that its competitor will do the 
same.10 Moreover, depending on the sign and the magnitude of iλ , (11) defines the out-of-
equilibrium conjectures of firm i  about the proposal of firm j . Specifically, if iλ  is equal to 
zero, then each firm neglects the strategic interaction between its own behaviour and the 
behaviour of its competitor.11 Furthermore, when iλ  is positive (negative), then firm i  
conjectures that any wage offer above equilibrium will lead firm j  to overbid (underbid) such 
an offer. 
Taking into consideration (11), the Jacobian matrix ( J ) of the dynamic system in (10) 
evaluated in (7) is given by 
                                                 
9 Out-of-equilibrium adjustments do not involve employment as autonomous variable when firms are constrained 
along their labour demand schedules. As I will explain in the next section, when firms compete for a given 
amount of labour force, an equilibrium below full employment is meaningless (e.g. Weiss 1991). Therefore, it 
seems reasonable to assume that firms adjust their optimal wage offers along their respective labour demand. 
Moreover, the dynamic system in (10) has the nice feature to verify Nash stationarity, i.e., its steady-state 
coincides with the Nash equilibrium of the game at hand (e.g. Sandholm 2005). 
10 It is worth noting that this is the case with no dynamics described by Hahn (1987) and implicitly warmly 
suggested by a number of game theorists (e.g. Bacharach 1976). 
11 In other words, in this case each firm thinks that for any given wage offer the competitor will leave its 
proposal unaltered. 
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where ( ) 0311121 1 >≡Ω −−−−− βααβα κβκβγα . 
A sufficient requirement for the local stability of the system in (10) is the negativity 
(positivity) of the trace (determinant) of J . Straightforward calculations suggest that the trace 
(Tr( J )) and the determinant (Det( J )) are equal to 
                                                       
( ) ( )
( ) ( )21
1
Det
Tr
λλ
λβ
−Ω=
+Ω=
J
J
                                                         (13) 
The results in (13) suggests that local stability requires 1λ  ( 2λ ) to be negative and 
higher than β  ( 1λ ) in modulus.12 Obviously, this means that the symmetric Nash equilibrium 
can be locally stable when each firm adjusts its wage offers in the direction of increasing 
profits by conjecturing that any wage offer above (below) equilibrium will lead its competitor 
to underbid (overbid) such an offer.13 
From an economic point of view, those findings imply that convergence towards the 
symmetric wage distribution in (7) requires that each firm myopically perceives a certain 
degree of substitution among the optimal wage offers put forward by its competitor. In this 
strategic framework, such a misperception could be achieved by assuming that κ  is subject to 
idiosyncratic shocks that systematically fades the perception of the actual reaction function of 
each firm.14 Interestingly, as implicitly suggested by (9), substitution among optimal offers is 
the requirement that would enable convergence in the simultaneous as well as in the alternate 
game of wage offers. However, in the latter case the equilibrium allocation would be 
inconsistent with the maximization of firms’ profits. 
 
                                                 
12 Under reasonable calibrations, e.g., 3/2=α , 2/1=β , 1== γκ , 7.01 −=λ  and 8.02 −=λ , J  
displays two complex-conjugate eigenvalues with negative real part. In this case, convergence towards the Nash 
equilibrium occurs though convergent oscillations. 
13 It is worth noting that without any conjectural variations, i.e., 0=iλ , the dynamic system would display a 
saddle-note bifurcation without any guide for dynamics. Moreover, when each firm conjectures that any wage 
offer above (below) equilibrium will lead each competitor to overbid (underbid) such an offer, i.e., 0>iλ , the 
Nash equilibrium is locally unstable. 
14 In the context of exchange rate dynamics, Gourinchas and Torell (2001) argue that idiosyncratic shocks might 
lead to systematic biases in individual forecasts. 
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5. Labour market outcomes 
Plugging (7) into (5) and then substituting in the first row of (2) allows to derive the 
equilibrium aggregate demand for labour. Specifically, in the symmetric Nash equilibrium the 
quantity of labour services demanded by the two firms amount to 
                                              ( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −−−−= ααβα κβ 111 1nLD                                                       (14) 
where 2=n . 
The result in (14) allows to characterize labour market tightness in a precise manner. 
In details, 
• if SD LL < , then the model economy experiences an involuntary unemployment rate equal 
to ( ) SDS LLL /− ; 
• if SD LL = , then there prevails full employment; 
• if SD LL > , then firms are rationed in the labour market so that actual employment is equal 
to SL  and each firm would have ( )SD LLn −/1  vacant positions. However, as suggested by 
Weiss (1991, p. 21), such an allocation cannot be an equilibrium; indeed, the shortage of 
labour would lead firms to increase their wage offers until DL  and SL  become equal.15 
Obviously, the first case is the situation considered by Hahn (1987). Within this 
involuntary unemployment scenario, taking into account movements in κ , the result in (14) 
can be exploited to discuss the cyclicality of effort. Specifically, plain differencing suggests 
that effort is counter-cyclical, i.e., equilibria with higher (lower) unemployment are 
characterized by higher (lower) effort levels. Such an effort pattern is perfectly consistent 
with the idea underlying efficiency-wage models in which involuntary unemployment acts a 
worker discipline device. In this class of models popularized by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), 
involuntary unemployment is the threat that prevents workers from shirking. As a 
consequence, an increase (decrease) in unemployment should lead workers with jobs to work 
harder (slowly), making them more (less) efficient (e.g. Uhlig and Xu 1996 and Guerrazzi 
2008). 
                                                 
15 It is worth noting that in this case the value of the marginal productivity of labour is higher than the level 
satisfying the Solow (1979) condition. Specifically, when firms are rationed in the labour market the effort-wage 
elasticity is lower than one. The same possibility is contemplated in dynamic efficiency-wage models developed 
inter alia by Faria (2000) and Guerrazzi (2008). 
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Although in the efficiency-wage competition model developed in section 2 the 
payment of an efficiency-wage is not related to the shirking motivation, effort is counter-
cyclical as well. However, there is an important difference between this model and the 
efficiency-wage models with shirking workers; indeed, in those models the counter-
cyclicality of effort emerges as the result of a Marxian (or Ricardian) endogeneity of labour 
supply (e.g. Bowles 1985 and Drago 1989-1990). By contrast, in the model economy 
developed in section 2 such a counter-cyclicality is the upshot of a wage competition process 
engaged by firms in the attempt to hire workers of higher quality in a technology scenario 
with decreasing returns with respect to labour. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
This paper provides a model of efficiency-wage competition along the lines put forward by 
Hahn (1987). Specifically, I build a two-firm efficiency-wage model in which the effort 
attainable by the representative firm is an increasing function of its own wage offer but 
declining in the offer put forward by its competitor. As a consequence, employers screen their 
workforce by means of increasing wage offers competing one another for high-quality 
employees. 
The main results achieved in this paper can be summarized as follows. First, using a 
specification of effort such that the maximum profit problem of the representative firm is 
concave, optimal wage offers are strategic complements, i.e., whenever the competitor 
increases (decreases) its wage offer, the optimal response for each firm is to rise (decrease) its 
wage offer as well. Second, a symmetric Nash equilibrium can be locally stable under the 
assumption that each firm adjusts its optimal wage offer in the direction of increasing profits 
by conjecturing that any wage offer above (below) equilibrium will lead the competitor to 
underbid (overbid) such an offer. Finally, the exploration of possible labour market equilibria 
reveals that effort is counter-cyclical, i.e., equilibria with higher (lower) unemployment are 
characterized by higher (lower) effort levels. 
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A. Appendix: Stackelberg equilibria 
In this section I derive the Stackelberg equilibrium of the model economy described in section 
2.16 Without loss of generality, I assume that firm 1 is the leader while firm 2 is the 
follower.17 In this case, firm 1 will try to maximize its profits by taking into account that firm 
2 will adhere to its reaction function. Therefore, firm 1’s problem becomes 
                                               
( )( )
12
11121111,
1
1
1
1
s.to
, max
11
ww
LwLwweF
wL
βκβ
π
−+−−=
−=
                                            (A.1) 
Taking into account (5), the solution of the problem in (A.1) provides the following 
wage distribution 
                        ⎟⎟⎠
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−+= 21 1
11 ββ
κSw                            (A.2) 
The results in (A.2) suggests in the Stackelberg equilibrium that firms 2 pays more 
than firm 1. As a consequence, firm 2 will be more efficient and will achieve higher profits.18 
Obviously, non-uniform wage and profit distributions, reveals that a Stackelberg equilibrium 
can provide a theoretical underpinning for segmented (or dual) labour markets (e.g. van de 
Klundert 1988 and Jellal and Wolff 2002). An illustration is given in Figure A.1. 
The diagram in figure A.1 recalls that the Stackelberg equilibrium is found where the 
highest iso-profit curve of firm 1 is tangent with reaction function of firm 2.19 Moreover, it is 
worth noting that Sw1  does not satisfy the Solow (1979) condition; indeed, in the Stackelberg 
equilibrium the leader effort-wage elasticity is higher than one.20 
 
                                                 
16 This exercise is relegated in Appendix because with effort function in (5) meaningful Stackelberg equilibria 
emerge if and only if the curvature of the effort function is quite strong, i.e., whenever β  is close to zero. 
17 Identical firms can play those different roles if, for instance, the labour market is segmented and there are 
relevant mobility costs that workers have to bear in order to switch from one segment to another. 
18 With complementarity among optimal wage offers, leadership is never preferred (Varian, 1992). 
19 When the wage offer of firm 1 is lower than the one of firm 2, firm 1’s profits are very low. Under those 
circumstances, the iso-profit curves of firm 1 become convex. 
20 This possibility is contemplated by Faria (2005) who develops an inter-temporal model with investment and 
efficiency-wages. 
 
MARCO GUERRAZZI 
 13
 
Figure A.1: Stackelberg equilibrium. 
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